1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII		
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4	HONOLULUTRAFFIC.COM, et	al., ) CIVIL NO. 11-00307AWT	
5	Plaintiffs	s, ) Honolulu, Hawaii ) November 30, 2011	
6	VS.	) 10:00 a.m.	
7	FEDERAL TRAFFIC ADMINISTRATION, et al.,	) VARIOUS MOTIONS and ) STATUS/SCHEDULING	
8	Defendants	) CONFERENCE	
9		) )	
10	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE A. WALLACE TASHIMA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE		
11			
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## 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 THE COURT: All right. Let's all be seated, 3 please. I ask the court to call the matter. 4 COURTROOM MANAGER: Civil 11-00307AWT, 5 Honolulutraffic.com, et al., versus Federal Transit 6 Administration, et al. This case has been called for 7 various motions and also status/scheduling conference. Counsel, your names for the record, please? 8 Nicholas Yost on behalf of plaintiffs. 9 MR. YOST: 10 I'm joined by Matthew Adams and Michael Green. 11 MR. GREEN: Good morning, Your Honor. THE COURT: Good morning. 12 13 MR. YEE: Good morning, Your Honor. 14 Harry Yee, Assistant United States Attorney 15 appearing for Peter Whitfield, Department of Justice, representing the Federal Transit Administration and all 16 17 named federal defendants. 18 THE COURT: Good morning. 19 MR. THORNTON: Good morning, Your Honor. Robert 20 Thornton on behalf of the City and County defendants. 21 with me at counsels' table are John Manaut at the Carlsmith Ball firm and, from the Corporation Counsel for 22 23 the City and County, Gary Takeuchi and Don Kitaoka. THE COURT: All right. Good morning to you. 24 25 MR. MANAUT: Good morning.

Okay. This is our first session. I don't know how many more we're going to have. I know it's in the paper today. It looks like there's going to be a little more funding likely for this project. So I guess that's not going to moot this case, lack of funding. So I think, you know, we have to be prepared to go forward and try to resolve this case in a timely manner. I think that's the primary reason I called this conference today.

Before we get to that part, there's a motion pending. I forgot whether it's just the federal defendants. I guess all defendants, right? Motion pending for, oh, I guess it's partial judgment on the pleadings.

Now, I ruled on the accompanying motion for judicial notice, oh, maybe a week or two ago. It seems to me with that ruling, you know, the motion doesn't have too much to stand on. But still, it's not completely -- completely undercut.

I think all that ruling indicates, though, is that -- and I think it's recognized in the conference report that some -- that the motion for judgment on pleadings in a sense may be premature, but it's hard to tell whether it's completely lacking in merit.

But whatever the case, I'll hear argument to the

extent you want to make it on the motion now. And I don't know whether I'll rule today, but I don't think it makes too much difference whether I rule on the motion today in terms of the status conference because the motion's not intended to do away with the entire case anyway. You know, I think it's all in an attempt to streamline it.

So I'll hear argument from moving parties.

Plaintiffs can have a chance to respond, then I'll give defendants their reply. Go ahead.

MR. THORNTON: Thank you, Your Honor. Again, Robert Thornton on behalf of the City and County defendants.

Thank you, Your Honor. We are obviously cognizant and have reviewed the Court's ruling on the request for judicial notice, but we would like to argue certain points that we still think are relevant to put the motion into proper context.

The first point, which is critical to this motion, Your Honor, is to emphasize the elaborate nature of the administrative proceedings, the lengthy administrative proceedings regarding this project; that this particular phase of the project's consideration by the Federal Transit Administration and the City and County lasted over five years. There were multiple opportunities for public review and comment, really extraordinary opportunities for

public review and comment. There was public notice of the alternatives analysis. There was a scoping process, so-called scoping process that's conducted under the National Environmental Policy Act, which provided a second step, if you will, of public comment, where there were five public hearings conducted. There was a circulation of draft environmental impact statement with an extension of the public comment period. And finally, there was the notice of availability of the final environmental impact statement leading to the record of decision by the Federal Transit Administration.

And the reason I emphasize that, Your Honor, is that the Supreme Court has made it clear in the Vermont Yankee and Public Citizen cases that plaintiffs have an obligation to structure their participation, to alert the agency to the parties' contention with sufficient specificity so that the agency may give meaningful consideration and correct errors.

And the Court has told us that the process should not be a game where plaintiffs make cryptic or obscure comments only to later make specific claims for the first time in a lawsuit. And as the Court's aware, this rule was founded on the principle that courts should not overturn administrative decisions unless those decisions are arbitrary and capricious and, also, where the

plaintiffs timely raised specific claims during the administrative process. And we've cited to the Court the authority on pages 22 and 23 of our opening memo in support of that proposition.

Now, we've noted in the Court's ruling on the request for judicial --

THE COURT: Well, you know, it's different if no plaintiffs make a comment. But a lot of your motion goes to the fact that some of the plaintiffs didn't; you know, have not commented, at least according to the truncated ROD and -- but that doesn't do anything for you in terms of narrowing the suit, does it?

MR. THORNTON: There's really two aspects to our motion, Your Honor. One is the fact that four of the plaintiffs, Plaintiffs Cayetano, Hee, Roth and the Small Business Entrepreneurial Education Foundation, failed to participate at all in the process. So it's not as if they participated but relied on others to submit comments. They failed, through a lengthy five-year process with multiple opportunities, to participate at all.

THE COURT: Well, what difference does that make if others participated?

MR. THORNTON: I think it makes a difference, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No, it's like, you know, the standing

jurisprudence. So you've got a bunch of plaintiffs, and one plaintiff is standing. That's sort of the end of the standing inquiry, isn't it?

MR. THORNTON: We believe that under the Public Citizen case, Your Honor, that the Supreme Court has articulated that in order to participate as a plaintiff in a federal lawsuit challenging federal agency decision, that it's incumbent on the individual plaintiffs to participate in the process. We think this is --

THE COURT: I'm not disagreeing with you. I'm just speaking in terms of what it's going to do for you practically in terms of, you know, defending against the suit. Not much, is it?

MR. THORNTON: Well, Your Honor, the -- and let me acknowledge the distinguished careers of those three named plaintiffs. If I didn't acknowledge them, I'm sure plaintiffs' counsel would remind me of that since they prominently recite those individuals in all of those papers.

So obviously they think it's significant that those particular individuals are plaintiffs in this case. We think it's significant, Your Honor, that those individuals failed to participate. They -- if they thought that this was an important matter -- and all three of them as I understand it are lawyers. They clearly are

prominent individuals -- if they thought it was important enough to bring a lawsuit, it should have been important enough for them to participate in the administrative process. That's our point, Your Honor, that they have waived their ability to be plaintiffs in this case. Even though, we understand, that the case may proceed on the basis of the allegations and standing of other individuals, the standing, I would point out, is yet an issue yet to be contested. As Your Honor knows, when you get to summary judgment stage of these cases, there is a enhanced obligation on the part of the plaintiffs to establish standing.

So for that reason, Your Honor, we think it's important. The plaintiffs have made a significant point of the participation of these individual plaintiffs, and we think it's important to point out that they failed to participate in the process at any time during the five years of proceedings.

Now, in the Court's ruling on the request for judicial notice, the Court noted that the record of decision summarized the comments that had been made by individuals in the record of decision but did not list all of those comments. However, the final environmental impact statement, which is Exhibit A to our request for judicial notice, which the Court accepted into judicial

notice, at pages 604 to 607 in the PDF format of the EIS lists each and every individual and entity and group that provided comments on the draft environmental impact statement; which, Your Honor, is the critical stage in the process under the National Environmental Policy Act, Section 4(f), the Transportation Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, to participate in the process to alert the agency to the plaintiffs' concerns. And the Court can refer to those pages of the final environmental impact statement, and you can see that none of the four plaintiffs that we've identified are listed there.

So although the final environmental -- or, rather, although the record of decision does not list every entity and individual that par -- that provided comments in the final environmental impact statement, the final environmental impact statement does include a comprehensive list, and that's before the Court. So at least the Court has evidence before it that -- that that -- at that critical stage of the proceeding those plaintiffs did not participate.

So finally on that point, Your Honor, we think that it's inconsistent with the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Vermont Yankee and Public Citizen cases for plaintiffs that entirely failed -- they didn't appear at a hearing. They didn't submit a letter. They

didn't submit a comment. They didn't appear at a scoping process. They didn't comment on the alternatives analysis -- and yet now they're a named plaintiff in this lawsuit.

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Now, with regard to the 4(f) claims, Your Honor -and again, I'm cognizant that the Court's ruling on the request for judicial notice indicate that the Court believes that it needs to have the entirety of the administrative record before it in order to rule on this aspect of our motion as well. But I wanted to set the stage based on the evidence that is before the Court in this motion and that's frankly uncontested; and that is, of the 14 so-called Section 4(f) properties -- Section 4(f), as the Court is aware, is a federal statute that requires the Federal Transit Administration to make certain findings for federal transportation projects that will use certain designated properties. And I emphasize the term "use," Your Honor, because that's a distinct legal requirement separate and part from the National Environmental Policy Act.

THE COURT: When you say in the 4(f) context "use" means like to actually take as you would --

MR. THORNTON: "Use" means physical use or what the courts, the Ninth Circuit, has characterized as constructive use of the property; where an impact is so

12 1 severe that the Federal Transit Administration project is 2 constructively using that particular property, which is --3 THE COURT: The way some people think the project 4 will impact this courthouse, right? 5 MR. THORNTON: That's -- that's one of the issues 6 that was raised. 7 THE COURT: Is that what you mean by constructive 8 use? 9 MR. THORNTON: I don't know but -- well, I think, 10 Your Honor, not to deny the importance of the courthouse, obviously, but the courthouse would not qualify as a 4(f) 11 12 property. 13 I understand that. I'm just trying to THE COURT: understand what you mean by constructive use. 14 15 MR. THORNTON: Constructive use, as it's been interpreted by the courts and defined in the regulations, 16 17 means a use that's so severe that the functions and the attributes of the property are significantly impacted. 18 19 It's a different concept, a more narrow concept, and it's 20 applicable to impacts under the National Environmental

So the point in our motion, Your Honor, is that with regard to six of the 14 4(f) properties that are specifically delineated in the plaintiffs' complaint, that there is no evidence that anybody mentioned those Section

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Policy Act.

4(f) sites. None whatsoever.

THE COURT: You mean there is no comment at all with respect to six of the properties?

MR. THORNTON: That's correct, Your Honor.

There's no comments at all. There's no mention of them in all of the plaintiffs' opposition papers in this motion.

I'm sure they scoured all of their record regarding their members and their plaintiffs' comments. They were not able to identify a single comment letter that named those properties.

Now, plaintiffs say, well --

THE COURT: It's not critically -- of course, I've never had anything to do with the 4(f) case. But it's not clear to me that, you know, it has to be approached property by property. But why can't you, you know, just look at the project as a whole?

MR. THORNTON: Because, Your Honor, the statute tells us it has to be approached property by property, the statute and regulations.

THE COURT: Is it crystal clear?

MR. THORNTON: We believe it is crystal clear, Your Honor. And we believe that the Ninth Circuit case law also makes it clear that it is a property-by-property evaluation. And we've cited the Greenbelt case, Your Honor, for that proposition, which makes it clear.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. What's your best case on that?

MR. THORNTON: Your Honor, we cited Laguna Greenbelt, Inc., versus U.S. Department of Transportation.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. THORNTON: But the statute, as the Court is well aware, you don't need to go to a regulation if the statute is clear. And the statute says that with regard to -- to the designated 4(f) properties, which are certain parks and historic cites, et cetera, that the Secretary of Transportation is required to make a specific finding with regard to the use of each of those individual properties.

So we think in the context of the clear terms of the statute indicates that it's a property-by-property designation. So in the context of these six properties we think this is a very -- a factual circumstance that's analogous to the facts in the Great Basin Mine Watch decision that we cited to the Court, a Ninth Circuit decision.

And in that case one of the claims alleged in the lawsuit was that the mining activity was going to adversely affect certain federal -- reserve federal water rights. And the plaintiffs there, as the plaintiffs are doing here, are saying, well, yes, it's true we didn't specifically reference federal reserved water rights in

our comments, but we talked about adverse impacts on water quality. We talked about water usage, et cetera. And that should have been sufficient to have exhausted our administrative remedies with regard to that claim.

And the Ninth Circuit held that that was not sufficient, that those comments were too attenuated. The specific claims characterized as a so-called 107 claim because it derives out of an executive order that's numbered 107. That, we think, is very analogous to the circumstance where a statute has a specific requirement that's distinct from the National Environmental Policy Act requirements, where the evaluation is done on a site-specific basis, where plaintiffs were able with regard to certain sites -- and we've cited in our papers the fact that -- that we know that plaintiffs were aware how to make a 4(f) claim. And I would cite the Court to page 23 of Exhibit Q of our request for judicial notice, which is --

THE COURT: Exhibit-what?

MR. THORNTON: Exhibit Q.

THE COURT: Okay, Q.

MR. THORNTON: Of our request for judicial notice.

THE COURT: Page?

MR. THORNTON: Page 23 of Exhibit Q.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. THORNTON: Pages 23 and 24.

THE COURT: 23.

MR. THORNTON: This is a comment letter submitted by the plaintiff Hawaii's a Thousand Friends. And on that page the plaintiffs -- and they have it in all bold, all bold and caps, "Probable violation of Sections 4(f) of the U.S. Department of Transportation Act, Re: Keehi Lagoon Beach Park." And they go on for several paragraphs to describe their claim with regard to the use of that particular 4(f) property.

So in that case, Your Honor, we see that plaintiffs, who are obviously quite sophisticated, were represented throughout these proceedings by individuals and entities that are quite sophisticated, familiar with federal environmental process, that they were able to articulate quite clearly their claim with regard to that one 4(f) site. But you can scour the record, Your Honor, and that is the only place in the record where a specific 4(f) violation is alleged.

Now, with regard to the other properties, I would put the 4(f) properties -- of the 14 that are listed in the plaintiffs' complaint, I would put them into three categories, six in the category where no comment whatsoever was made. The site was never identified by any plaintiff. And that's Merchant Street Historic Park,

Pacific War Memorial site, Makalapa Naval Housing
District, the Hawaii Employers Council, the Tamura
Building, and the DOT Harbors Division Building. Nobody
made any comment. Nobody even identified those sites.

Then there are a second category of three properties that the plaintiffs did identify, but they never mentioned Section 4(f) in the context of their comments on those properties. And that's Walker Park, Queen Street Park, and the Pearl Harbor Historic District.

And then the third set of properties are properties where at least one plaintiff made a reference to Section 4(f) with regard to the property, although they did not articulate a specific claim under 4(f). And that's the properties Aloha Tower, Irwin Memorial Park, Mother Waldron Park, and Piers 10 and 11.

So our point, Your Honor, is we think that there is sufficient evidence before the Court. And I would say that we understand the Court's point that in order to finally decide whether there is an absence of comment on these sites, that it may be that -- that the Court needs the entirety of the administrative record. But I would suggest that clearly had plaintiffs been able to identify a comment with regard to those six properties, they would have provided that. We note that in the plaintiffs' opposition papers and in their own declarations they did

identify one additional comment by an individual that they allege to be a member of one of the plaintiff organizations that had made various 4(f) comments. But again, not with regard to those six sites.

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So in summary, Your Honor, we do not believe it sufficient for plaintiffs to make vague references to impacts to parks or to historic sites without making a specific reference to how the project will use the park or the historic site and why the Federal Transit Administration designation of either no use, no constructive use, or a de minimis impact, which are the three different categories of characterization that's available in the Federal Transit Administration under Section 4(f). We do not think it's sufficient for the plaintiffs just to say, oh, there are historic sites or there are parks within the area of the project and that there is this thing called Section 4(f). We do not believe under the Ninth Circuit case law, and particularly under the Great Basin Mine Watch decision, that those kinds of comments are sufficient for the plaintiffs to have demonstrated that they exhausted their administrative remedies and adequately participated in the administrative process.

Now, just one final point, Your Honor, and that is, that if the Court feels that given the state of the

record or the evidence before the Court in this particular motion that it's not able to -- to grant this particular motion, it would be the defendants' intention to renew this motion as a motion for partial summary judgment.

THE COURT: All right. Before you sit down, let me just -- let me ask a question on the merits now.

Assuming plaintiffs get past the stage of I'll call it standing but, you know, that they commented sufficiently to go forward with the claim, what is the -- if we get to the merits, just tell me what the basic standard is for judging a 4(f) claim.

MR. THORNTON: As a basis --

THE COURT: And I don't mean arbitrary and capricious. I mean, you know, what's the basic standard?

MR. THORNTON: Well, the basic standard is based -- the basic APA standard that's been articulated. The Supreme Court articulated it in the Overton Park case. But it is an arbitrary and capricious standard of review.

THE COURT: I know that. What does that mean in a 4(f) case?

MR. THORNTON: In 4(f), I believe, Your Honor, it means that the Court is -- is required to determine whether the Federal Transit Administration in this case gave a careful inquiry as to the use and potential use of 4(f) properties and that its finding, its factual

determination that the project was not going to use or was -- or that -- or that there was use but the -- there was no reasonable and prudent alternative, that those factual findings are not arbitrary and capricious. I believe that is the applicable standard of review in this case.

THE COURT: Is it incumbent on the agency in the first instance to identify all the 4(f) properties?

MR. THORNTON: Yes, it is, Your Honor. And -- and we believe that the FTA did that here.

THE COURT: And then the second step is to assess whether or not there's any impact?

MR. THORNTON: If there's -- there's actually, I would say, probably three steps to the 4(f) process. There is -- the first step would be the identification of the potential on the properties that require some level of investigation to determine whether there may be a use of the property. So that's kind of the first screening level. The second screening level then is a -- a more specific inquiry as to whether the project activities will in fact use, actually use, take land out of the property or constructively use the property. And then if the agency determines that there is a use of the property, then what the statute indicates that the agency is required to determine whether there was any feasible and

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    prudential alternative. And those are terms of art that
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    I'm sure we'll brief at length in this case.
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            So those are the basic steps of the administrative
    process regarding 4(f).
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            THE COURT: All right. Now, for these 14
    properties -- when I say "these 14," the 14 that you say
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    were not sufficiently commented on -- for the 14
    properties, they were identified by the FTA --
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            MR. THORNTON: That's correct.
            THE COURT: -- as 4(f) properties?
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            MR. THORNTON:
                           A]] --
            THE COURT: So that's not an issue, right?
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            MR. THORNTON:
                           That's not an issue, no.
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            THE COURT: All right. So the issue is whether or
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    not the FTA, I don't know, gave sufficient consideration
    to the impact and whether its --
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            MR. THORNTON:
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            THE COURT: -- decision is supported.
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            MR. THORNTON: I think that's -- that's correct.
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    I would -- I would refine it perhaps a little bit, Your
    Honor, to say at the end of the day the question is: Was
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    the -- was the agency's finding with regard to each of
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    those 4(f) properties, whether it was no use or
    constructive use or no feasible and prudent alternative,
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    was that finding at the end of the day arbitrary and
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1 capricious. I think that's the test. 2 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. 3 MR. THORNTON: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Yost? 4 5 MR. YEE: If I could have some brief argument, 6 Your Honor, on behalf of the FTA? THE COURT: I'm sorry. Go ahead. 7 Yes. 8 MR. YEE: Thank you, Your Honor. Again, Harry 9 Yee, Assistant United States Attorney for the Federal 10 Transit Administration and all named federal defendants, 11 Your Honor. Just -- just a follow-up on a couple of points of 12 Mr. Thornton's this morning, Your Honor. You know, this 13 14 was a very lengthy process that the City and the FTA went 15 through to scope the environmental impact of this project. There were public hearings on this matter. There were 16 17 extended periods of public comment for the draft 18 environmental impact statement for this project, multiple 19 opportunities, both before the Federal Transit 20 Administration and the City and County of Honolulu, to 21 comment on this project. And to go, I think, to the concern that the Court 22 23 had about practicality, Your Honor, of the standing of the three individuals and Small Business Enterprise Hawaii, I 24 think it's judicial economy, Your Honor. Is that if these 25

1 individuals have not participated at the agency level, 2 what is there for this Court to review that they've 3 commented on? And if the Court's concern is, hey, you 4 know, they've had --5 THE COURT: What do you think --6 MR. YEE: They're making the same comment that 7 other people are --THE COURT: Just a minute. Are you saying a case 8 9 like this, that the -- the plaintiff is limited in 10 challenging a 4(f) designation to the scope of the comments made in the administrative proceeding? That's 11 the only argument they can make in court? Is that what 12 13 you're saying? MR. YEE: I believe so, Your Honor. 14 15 THE COURT: What is there to review? Is that what 16 you mean, or do you mean something else? 17 MR. YEE: Well, my point, Your Honor, is as to the three named individuals and the institution that did not 18 19 participate at the administrative level, I think the 20 Court's point earlier was, well, they're essentially 21 making the same arguments that the plaintiffs who did participate are making: Why shouldn't they be able to 22 23 stay in this process? Well, it goes to the heart of the Administrative 24

Procedures Act and that is, again, standing, you know?

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For the purposes of the Administrative Procedures Act, they need to have participated because there is a vested interest which they're carrying out in seeking judicial review, Your Honor. And that's not present here.

And the argument, practically speaking, is judicial economy. What purpose does it serve for this Court to have these parties or any other parties who choose to participate at this point? And that's my only issue, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Okay, plaintiffs?

MR. YOST: Thank you, Your Honor.

Let me in response raise -- discuss four matters. First, why, as Your Honor intimated, the administrative record is important; two, responding to defendants' no comments on the 4(f) site issue; three, responding to defendants' -- plaintiffs' fail to exhaust issue; and 4, responding to Your Honor's questions on Section 4(f).

First, starting with the administrative record.

The administrative record is absolutely basic to the issues that are in front of the Court today and will be in the future. It is for two reasons: One, for obviously timing reasons; but more immediately, the administrative record is important to see whether comments have been made and are or are not before the agency at the time they made

their decision. And I will get to -- to the case citations on that. But as Your Honor accurately said, if somebody's raised the issue, then the issue is before -- is before the agency, and Mr. Yee's comment about judicial economy is simply misplaced. Judicial economy is not served if a case is going to go forward anyway by, you know, delving into whether -- given that plaintiffs A, B, C, and D have standing and have exhausted, whether or not plaintiffs D and E did -- did or not.

In the -- let me turn to the administrative record and the chronology. Here's a case where a complaint was filed on May 12. Half a year has passed. On September 12 the government informed us that there -- they have narrowed it to a universe of 500,000 documents that have been assembled. That's Exhibit E to my declaration. As of September 26, there were at least seven attempts to get the administrative record from the federal government, and that's cited in the Adams declaration and my declaration.

And as of the date of the joint case management statement, which was November 18th, the government still didn't say when the administrative record would be prepared but only said they would, quote, "update the Court," closed quote, next year, on January 13th of -- on or before January 18th on the status of the record. We need that record to pass

upon this case.

Let me pass now to the second matter, which is the allegation that there are no comments on 4(f) sites. First, that goes to the merits and presumably will be discussed in the motion for summary judgment. Section 4(f) says what the feds must consider; it doesn't say how individual plaintiffs are to structure participation. But also, the government's assertion that there was no comments on the -- on the 4(f) sites is simply wrong. The comments are cited in our opposition, at page 16, and what follows. There is the Honolulu Transit submission, which Mr. Slater in his declaration included. Attached to the Adams declaration is Hawaii Transit Members Michelle Matson's submission.

It is important, I think, to look at what the standard is. The Ninth Circuit has said, in the National Parks case and in the Idaho Sporting Congress case, that you don't have to use, quote, "magic words" -- excuse me -- or cite statutes. And after all, Hawaii Transit, for instance, was not represented by an environmental lawyer. They didn't use magic words. But there are phrases used in the various submissions like Downtown Historic Districts, Downtown Waterfront. Ms. Matson used the phrase "The Historic Complex," Exhibit I to the Adams declaration. There is page 5-10 of the FEIS has a map

which shows these -- where these various places are and where they are relative to the Historic Downtown, the Waterfront and -- and so on.

Next, this case is a case that revolves around alternatives. Alternatives come up under 4(f). Alternatives come up under NEPA. The very document which is the nub of the case is entitled, "Draft Environmental Impact Statement and Section 4(f) Evaluation." That is what people commented on. Anybody who commented was commenting on -- on 4(f).

Next, the defendants allege that some plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. And as Your Honor accurately pointed out at the outset, the judicial economy simply does not require, and Ninth Circuit law does not require, that either for purposes of exhaustion or for standing that if somebody has raised the issue that somebody else raise the issue as well.

Plaintiffs -- defendants, in making their motion directed at certain of the plaintiffs, impliedly concede that other plaintiffs did exhaust. And that's all that it takes under the Ninth Circuit case, in Liliuokalani Coalition versus Rumsfeld, in the Barnes versus Department of Transportation case. That's enough.

And let me refer -- Mr. Thornton was -- was making remarks about three of the plaintiffs and the degree to

whether they participated or not. Let me just take one by one of an example.

Former Governor Cayetano has been speaking out on the issue of this rail in public for consistently throughout this entire process. It is not -- he did not in the many presentations that he made, he did not appear before a, quote, "NEPA" hearing or 4(f) hearing of one of the agencies. He wrote, for instance, three op-ed pieces in the local newspaper, in the Advertiser. He tells me that he sent those to members of the -- of the City Council. He was part of the public dialogue that was taking place whether or not he additionally appeared in a -- in a public forum.

THE COURT: Are you saying --

MR. YEE: In a 4(f) forum.

THE COURT: Are you saying that should qualify as a comment on the (inaudible) --

MR. YOST: I'm saying that that is part of the larger issue. But until we have the administrative record, for instance, we don't know whether somewhere in the 500,000 documents, we don't know whether another member of the public picked up one of Governor Cayetano's op-ed pieces and forwarded it to the agency and said, you know, we agree with the -- with the governor on this. That's why we need the administrative record in order to

be able to make that determination.

The Supreme Court, in saying what needs to be exhausted and what doesn't need to be exhausted, used a quote, "so obvious" test: If something's so obvious, it doesn't have to be specifically raised. Well, here, physically, we're talking about a rail system for 20 miles, elevated, concrete, 35 to 50 feet high, height of a three- or four-story building -- as Your Honor pointed out, coming right outside the window of this -- this courtroom -- 21 rail stations, each the height of six-story buildings.

There are renderings in the documents before the Court. There are renderings from both the government and Honolulu Transit attached to the Slater declaration.

There's also Exhibit F to the Adams declaration, which were the comments that were submitted by the American Institute of Architects, with their own renderings. It's the sort of thing one can look at and just see, "This is pretty obvious." And you think of the non-party entities who commented in this process, to which we alluded in the complaint, groups like the National Trust for Historic Preservation, which is a federally chartered semigovernment agency, the American Institute of Architects, the League of Women Voters of Honolulu. It's pretty obvious the decision-makers knew that these were -- were

hot issues.

Then the Ninth Circuit, in elaborating on the Supreme Court's "so obvious" test, said look at whether the agency had independent knowledge. If the agency had independent knowledge, then something doesn't have to be raised specifically. And again, to know whether the agency had independent knowledge, we need to see the administrative record.

And the defendants themself admit that there will be an adverse impact on at least 32 historic resources. I would invite the Court's attention to Section 4-26 of the federal -- of the final environmental impact statement, especially pages 4-187 to 191. Then finally, let me turn to the Court's question to defendants' counsel about 4(f) and the standards under 4(f).

And, of course, we start with arbitrary and capricious test. But it's not the "take a look" test. This is not NEPA alternatives. This is more -- more demanding. It's not even take the hard look that NEPA requires. It is, "Thou shalt avoid." And it has two separate aspects to it: One, is there a prudent and reasonable alternative? If so, it must be chosen. And, two, that all possible mitigation must be applied. Those are strict, tough tests.

And here we're dealing with a situation where over

the years people had raised issues of managed lane alternatives, bus alternatives, light rail alternatives, monorail alternatives, all sorts of different alternatives. And when they got to their FEIS and 4(f) document, they limited literally to steel wheels on steel rails two routing alternatives. That was it. They just dropped all those other alternatives. How can you tell whether there is a prudent and feasible alternative if they didn't even look at it?

Thank you, Your Honor. I have some further questions.

THE COURT: Thank you.

I'll give the defense, I think, a brief reply.
All right?

MR. THORNTON: Thank you, Your Honor. Just a couple of comments in response to plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs' rubric that if a project is big that the legal claims are obvious and therefore individuals don't have to participate in the process, it seems to me, would eviscerate the notion of exhaustion of administrative remedies and requirement established by the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee and Public Citizen. It's not enough for folks to say a project is big, gee, it has impacts. The Ninth Circuit made that clear in the Great Basin Mine watch decision. That's not sufficient.

Mr. Yost uncuts his own argument by then going on to talk about the specific requirements of 4(f). And as we articulated, 4(f) is different than NEPA. So it's not sufficient for plaintiffs just to make vague references about impacts.

Under Vermont Yankee and Public Citizen, they were obligated to explain specifically why they thought the Federal Transit Administration determination regarding use of those properties was -- was flawed or somehow in error. And again, because the courts have advised us, the purpose of the process is so that the agency is put on notice so it can turn around and respond to those notices. And as the Court has noted in the record of decision, the Federal Transit Administration did an extremely diligent job responding to each and every comment that was made even at the stage, that late stage of the proceeding.

Finally, with regard to the representations by counsel today that Mr. Cayetano wrote op-ed articles, spoke out against the rail, all I would say, Your Honor, is they had an opportunity to submit those documents and they didn't. So if they exist, then for whatever reason plaintiffs chose not to present those to the Court today would suggest to me that those documents are not in record, but I guess we'll find out when we see the record.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. YEE: One point briefly, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. YEE: Thank you, Your Honor.

I take issue with Mr. Yost's argument wherein he cites Liliuokalani Coalition versus Rumsfeld in support of plaintiffs' position that the three named plaintiffs in Small Business Enterprise Hawaii are entitled to be in this proceeding. In that case, Your Honor, I actually argued part of the motion for preliminary injunction in that case. And there was evidence before Judge Ezra in this court that there was not a full and complete opportunity for everybody in the community be heard in this case. And I think that's a important distinction to make from this case, where there has been five years of significant opportunity before both the City and County and the Federal Transit Administration.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Okay, perhaps it can't be avoided, but obviously a lot of the argument today is really on the merits and the scope of judicial review, issues of that nature. But what I'm really struggling with on this motion is whether or not based only on the allegations of the complaint the matter as asserted by defendants by way of defense or by way of standing are

proper, is a proper subject of judicial notice. I mean, that's really the only question I think on this motion, you know. And so kind of put aside the merits, and I'm sure we'll get back to it again and again.

But nonetheless, your arguments have been useful. I thank counsel for it in all. But as I said at the beginning, you know, this -- whatever the ruling on the motion for partial judgment on the pleading is not going to make the case go away. So we'll have to -- all of us have to contend with the ongoing case anyway. So on that basis I'm going to -- I'm going to submit the motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. I'll have a ruling before I hope too long, but I don't think it's going to affect our further schedule.

Because, you know, it might add some to the work depending how early that motion is decided and which way it's decided. But still, I think the basic judicial review process is going to have to take its course.

So with that then I'm going to appoint -- I'm going to shift to the -- to the scheduling conference that I called, which is really the primary reason for our being here, I think. And I think it's obviously important that this case be decided on as timely a basis as possible. I would like to avoid, for instance, having to decide a motion for preliminary injunction. And, you know, I'd

like to work toward that end, you know. I know that a lot of that is beyond the control of those of us in the front of the courtroom; but, you know, if it comes to that, it comes to that. But still, that's something we may have to consider later.

But I think a timely resolution is important. I think the one thing everybody seems to agree on -- or one of the things everybody seems to agree on is that this case should be decided on the administrative record; that is, I think they contemplate the -- for which I say -- well, the submission of some evidence outside the record. But as far as I can tell from what I've read so far, that evidence would, you know, consist only of I'll call it standing issues, I think what you call jurisdictional issues. But I don't think, you know, it'll go to the merits or the scope of review or anything like that. I don't believe from what I know at this stage.

So first question is -- because everything else depends on this -- how soon the administrative record can be prepared and filed, and I'll say settled. You know, in the usual case -- when I say "the usual case," in most environmental review cases, it's not a problem to -- to settle the record. I mean, everybody agrees on what the record is and maybe because it's not as large as this one is represented to be. But still, the parties should have

recognized that there could be some issues with respect to the -- the accuracy and the scope of the administrative record and whether it's complete, things of that nature.

And the parties have, I think, represented that they'll try to confer and agree on that. But --

So I'm going to start with asking -- well, I guess I don't know who -- I don't know who knows better, the City and County or the FTA. But as to defendants, give me a ball park estimate on when the administrative record will be ready.

MR. THORNTON: Your Honor, I'll make a stab at that because the defendants obviously have been coordinating with regard to the preparation of the record. And as we indicated in the joint case management statement, rough ballpark estimate, we think we're about 75 percent of the way through compiling the documents; that we think as of the middle of January, we suggested January 13th for further report back to the Court on the status of the record at that point in time and a more precise date as to when the record might be lodged with the Court. And as we've indicated, we've worked out with the plaintiffs a process for defendants to provide the plaintiffs with an index at that point so that we can then meet and confer of the contents of the record and see if we can agree if there — that we can avoid the need for

further proceedings about the contents of the record. And we've suggested a timetable then for -- for -- for supplementary motion.

THE COURT: First thing is, how long do you think it'll take to settle the record?

MR. THORNTON: Again, it's hard for me to predict, Your Honor, as to whether the plaintiffs are going to disagree with the contents of the record or not, but I would hope that in -- you know, in time of February time frame we should have our arms around the complete record at that point in time and then be able to kick off the briefing schedule.

THE COURT: Does that sound reasonable to you, Mr. Yost?

MR. YOST: Your Honor, yes, it does. Defendants are not going to be starting construction in the interim, and the most recent letter from -- from Mr. Thornton to -- to us, dated October 26, referred to -- very obliquely to February of 2012, the West Oco (phonetic) Farrington Highway guideway foundations, and maintenance and storage facility, utility, slash, grading, slash, drainage, slash roads issues being -- the construction starting in February. So that, to me, is the only imponderable.

THE COURT: All right. So the plaintiffs' position is that -- I mean, even you, you don't want even

the first shovelful to be turned; is that right?

MR. YOST: Well, Your Honor, actually looking for guidance in the CEQ regulations, 40 CFR 1506.1, there are two tests: One, that there not be significant environmental impact during the pendency of a NEPA proceeding; and two, that alternatives not be disclose -- foreclosed. A shovelful is not an issue. It's when serious ground-disturbing activities of the sort that either themselves have a major environmental impact or which commit the agency in a way which it can't back off from, commit the agency to a particular alternative. And frankly, from Mr. Thornton's letter, I can't tell whether these projected actions amount to that or not, but they certainly raised a red flag in my mind.

THE COURT: Well, I guess what I'm getting at is, is your challenge that this project should not go ahead at all, or you think you might be satisfied with some changes, re-alignments and things like that?

MR. YOST: Well, our challenge --

THE COURT: Or can't you say?

MR. YOST: Our challenge is more basic than that, than not just re-alignments, though that is a possible alternative outcome. But alternatives such as the managed busway alternative, in which case there would be -- toward the west there would be an elevated access system. But

1 then it would not come through the downtown areas, 2 Chinatown and so on. 3 THE COURT: I'll tell you what I'm getting at. MR. YOST: Excuse me. 4 5 THE COURT: At least a lot of your objections seem 6 to focus on the project when it gets closer to downtown, 7 right? 8 MR. YOST: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: So, I mean, would you be -- I mean, 9 10 would construction -- I'll say, you know, out toward Kapolei -- would that bother you in the sense that it 11 represents to you a -- the type of commitment that can't 12 13 be reversed and so you'd seek a preliminary injunction against, you know, that kind of start? 14 15 MR. YOST: If it is of the sort that represents a 16 commitment to steel wheels on steel rails, as distinct 17 from alternate means of transit, yes. 18 THE COURT: When you say steel wheel on steel 19 rails, you mean for the entire route or for any part? 20 MR. YOST: Well, I think there has not been discussion of different systems for different -- different 21 portions of the entire route. 22 23 THE COURT: So it's all or nothing? 24 MR. YOST: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. So then once construction 25

starts on the rail project, I mean, that's it; isn't it?

MR. YOST: That -- that is it. Serious construction. Again, you know, Your Honor started off by saying a shovel full. And, you know, no problem with a shove full but something which commits them to the alternative, which we think they should be re-examining.

THE COURT: Well, part of the conundrum, too, is since it's in a sense a cooperative project between the FTA and the City and County, part of the commitment includes the commitment to -- by the FTA to I assume furnish X percent of the financing, and I assume that financing has to be based on something concrete. And it's 'cause, well, we'll give you five billion dollars. You can either build a rail or you can build a bus line. You take a pick, right? It's not that kind of agreement to finance, is it? I mean, it's based upon, I assume, a specific proposal. Isn't that right?

MR. YOST: I think that is an accurate statement, Your Honor.

When -- in the prior letter, the June 23 letter to me from Mr. Thornton, which is attached to my declaration, there was discussion of funding and it -- none of it looked like it was imminent construction sort of funding, so it didn't -- you know, it didn't raise our hackles.

But -- but this most recent communication, which I alluded

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    before, just a month ago, you know, that looks like
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    serious construction is going to start, and that's the
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    sort of thing which 4(f) and NEPA compliance, full
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    compliance must proceed.
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            THE COURT: All right. Well, it seems to me --
    okay, I think I've heard enough on that. It seems to me
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    then, you know, we should construct the schedule today, at
    least a tentative schedule on going ahead with this
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    lawsuit. And just bear in mind that at some point that
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    schedule may be interrupted or further burdened by a
    motion for preliminary injunction, right? That's just a
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    judgment that plaintiffs will have to make depending on,
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    you know, what their perception is as to what's going on;
    isn't that right?
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            MR. YOST: I think that is accurate, Your Honor,
    absent a representation on the part of the defendants that
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    they would not do anything which would either involve
    significant environmental impact or which would
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    irreparably wed them to one alternative in the end.
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                         I think those -- I don't want to call
            THE COURT:
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    it concession. But those agreements are hard to come by.
            MR. YOST: I've seen the government doing it
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    before, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT: Okay.
                                So --
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MR. THORNTON: Your Honor, might I speak to a

1 couple of these points? 2 THE COURT: Sure. 3 MR. THORNTON: I think we can help a little bit by 4 clarifying what has been proposed. First of all, as Your 5 Honor appreciates, this a very large, complex project. A 6 lot of things have to happen in the correct sequence. But 7 just to make it real clear, we've been in regular communication with plaintiffs' counsel, as Mr. Yost has 8 So we're not hiding the ball in terms of the 9 indicated. status of construction. 10 All of the construction activities during the 11 12 first phase, which would be through the entirety of 2012, is going to be on the Kapolei end of the project, as the 13 Court referenced. So there will be nothing done --14 15 THE COURT: Say it again. MR. THORNTON: A]] --16 17 THE COURT: Say it again. Phase I is all through, 18 around Kapolei? 19 MR. THORNTON: All through 2012, through 2012 will all be during construction activities in the first phase, 20 21 which is all on the Kapolei end of the project. Now --THE COURT: Yes, but it -- it's going to be -- I 22 23 don't know what you contemplate doing there, but it's going to be rail-oriented, right? 24 25 MR. THORNTON: That's --

1 THE COURT: Are you going to start laying 2 foundation for --3 MR. THORNTON: That's correct, Your Honor. The 4 work in the course -- again, as to the current sequence, 5 we've done an analysis, and we're prepared to sit down with plaintiffs. And we've indicated to that as most 6 7 recently as the meet and confer and the case management statement, that we're prepared to sit down with them and 8 go through with them in detail what is proposed. But from 9 10 our perspective, and we've mapped out, there are no sensitive resources that would be impacted --11 12 THE COURT: No, but that --13 MR. THORNTON: -- through the period of briefing on cross-motion for --14 15 THE COURT: But that doesn't address the plaintiffs' concern about in the sense an irrevocable 16 17 commitment to a rail project, right? 18 MR. THORNTON: It doesn't address their concern, 19 Your Honor. 20 Right. THE COURT: 21 MR. THORNTON: But that's -- that's not the 22 standard, as the Court is aware. 23 THE COURT: What I'm getting at is the likelihood we'll get a motion for preliminary injunction. 24 That's

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what I'm worried about.

1 MR. THORNTON: We'll endeavor -- I would say on 2 behalf of the City and County defendants we'll endeavor to 3 work with the plaintiffs to attempt to avoid that but --4 what I do want to make clear, Your Honor, that this is a 5 project that does have to occur in appropriate construction phasing process. Very complex matter. We've 6 7 advised the plaintiffs, in fact. And so the Court is aware, there are certain activities going on today, and 8 the plaintiffs are well aware of that. 9 10 pre-construction activity. There is utility relocation There are geotechnical investigations ongoing. 11 12 They've been aware of that for months. And if they 13 thought there was a problem, they could have come in and sought some form of injunctive relief. 14 15 But we're not prepared to sit here today to concede that we're not going to proceed with --16 17 THE COURT: Right. MR. THORNTON: -- construction on a very large 18 project. But I just want to make the point, Your Honor, 19 20 that the standard under Winters, the plaintiffs have to --21 THE COURT: No, we're not there yet. MR. THORNTON: Understood, Your Honor. 22

THE COURT: You know, I don't want to hear your argument about why they're not entitled to preliminary injunction. I don't even want to hear that motion, all

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right? You don't have to address Winters to me, not at this stage.

All right. So the question, all I'm asking is:

Is there some likelihood we're going to get a motion?

That's what I'm talking about. I don't want you to tell

me why he shouldn't win the motion, because he's going to

tell me why you shouldn't win it.

MR. THORNTON: Again, Your Honor, my representation in Court is we'll endeavor to work with the plaintiffs. We don't believe we're going to engage in any activities that would warrant a motion for preliminary injunction. But at the end of the day, as the Court noted, that's the plaintiffs' call to make.

THE COURT: Right. Okay, so I think we'll just have to contemplate the poss -- you know, we should -- we should read the schedule, but we have to contemplate at some point that could be interrupted by a motion for -- interrupted or burdened by a motion for preliminary injunction.

So the first issue is the settlement -- the preparation, filing, and settlement of the administrative record, right? And I think if we get the schedules correctly that's within -- that's in the status report, you know, you're you talking about, let's see, from that point, in effect, four months of briefing time, right? To

get to a motion for -- motions and cross-motions for preliminary injunction being briefed, without any time -- and we'll get to that, you know, for -- I forgot -- I guess what the defendants call jurisdictional discovery, which I assume you may want before certain briefs are due, right? I would think.

So all I'm getting at is that, you know, we're talking about for, you know, at least, well, five to six months after the administrative record is prepared. So you're talking about the end of summer, you know, maybe early fall before we can even have a hearing on these motions. That's a -- you know, that's a long way off and a lot may -- a lot may happen on the project, right, with respect to, you know, securing funding and then going ahead with certain construction activity.

So, you know, I don't think we can construct -you know, construct a tight schedule at this point. I
think, you know, all we can do is sort of get some target
dates to shoot for; and then there'll be, I think, things
in between that have to be addressed, things such as -well, we can address summary today -- discovery, of
whether or not the defendants want to -- I think they
speak in the scheduling report about maybe filing some
motions for summary adjudication ahead of other motions on
the merits, things like that. You know, all this is going

to just stretch out the record.

But my aim still is to move this case as expeditiously as possible, you know, keeping in mind that -- and I understand this, you know -- the people that are planning the project and trying to secure funding for it, I mean, they, you know, have a commitment to go ahead with the construction of the project, right? So all those things I think we have to address.

So the first thing, though, is to, you know, what, maybe look for the federal defendants -- or I guess both defendants because they're both involved in this -- to complete some form of the administrative record by mid January, right? And then -- well, I don't know -- and then the parties, say, within a month, by mid February, try to agree on whether or not that record is accurate and complete. Because both parties have agreed that this case should be decided factually on the administrative record, which I think is, you know, correct as a matter of law. Because I don't see this so far, at least, as the kind of case where the Court would want, I would say, extra record evidence on the merits.

All right. So that takes us to mid -- if we get to mid February. Now, the next thing is I think defendants indicated they want some discovery, right? Am I correct?

MR. THORNTON: We want to reserve the right for discovery depending on what we see in terms of the plaintiffs' affidavit.

THE COURT: So you want to reserve that right until -- you want to wait until plaintiffs file their declaration in support of their motion for summary judgment?

MR. THORNTON: Right. We had suggested in the case management statement, Your Honor, that ahead of the cross-motions that plaintiffs would provide standing affidavits and that there is a time frame set out for us to decide whether or not to seek discovery.

THE COURT: Well, that's before --

MR. YOST: Either -- pardon me. If I might interject, Your Honor? But your -- the statement which Your Honor made earlier on analogizing the standing issue to the exhaustion issue at least might raise in defendants' mind the question whether given the assumed standing of certain of the plaintiffs, whether it is worth their time and the Court's time to debate the standing of others of the plaintiffs.

MR. THORNTON: Your Honor, all I would say in response is it is plaintiffs' obligation in the first instance to provide standing affidavits. I don't think defendants have to assume the plaintiffs have standing,

1 but that the mere allegations in the complaint are not 2 sufficient to support a motion for summary judgment. 3 THE COURT: Oh, but you agree generally the law on 4 standing is that -- is that if one plaintiff is standing, 5 it's good enough. But I think what you're saying is, 6 well, you have to show at least one plaintiff is standing 7 say, for instance, for each 4(f) property, right? That's correct. 8 MR. THORNTON: THE COURT: I mean, you're carrying the standing 9 10 argument that far? 11 MR. THORNTON: Yes, Your Honor. Standing is, I don't know, maybe 12 THE COURT: 13 standing to bring a claim. So you construe an attack --I'll call it an attack on each 4(f) property, it's a 14 15 separate claim? 16 MR. THORNTON: We do construe 4(f) that way, Your 17 Honor. THE COURT: Well, obviously I can't rule on that 18 19 I don't know the law on 4(f). I'll admit that. now. 20 But, well, I did make, you know, that kind of comment earlier, but obviously it's not a ruling in the 21 context of 4(f) because I said I never had a 4(f) case. 22 23 So I think I just have to go ahead, and both sides will

So is it correct that plaintiffs are willing to

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have to develop their case.

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    supply, I'll call them, standing affidavits if requested
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    by the defendants? Are you planning to do that anyway
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    or --
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            MR. YOST: We will do so if requested by the
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    defendants.
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            THE COURT: All right. So that's a process you --
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    and then once the defendants see the -- see the standing
    affidavits or declaration, then you'll decide whether
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    you'll want to depose the plaintiff on that, right?
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            MR. THORNTON:
                           That's correct, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT: Is that right?
                           That's correct, your Honor.
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            MR. THORNTON:
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            THE COURT: Okay.
                               How much time -- well, you can
              I don't know how many plaintiffs there are.
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    do that.
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    There aren't that many?
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            MR. THORNTON: I think we suggested a period of
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    time in the case management statement, but I would think
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    that we would be able to conduct, complete the discovery
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    in a month.
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            THE COURT: All right.
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            MR. THORNTON: Assuming the parties are
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    cooperating.
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            THE COURT: Okay. And I think this is, by the
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    way, a good case in which to cooperate, you know?
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    you're both obviously acknowledged environmental lawyers,
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51 1 and you both know what you're doing. The government, I 2 have to assume -- although I always don't -- knows what 3 it's doing. 4 MR. YEE: We try to, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: So, you know, I don't see why this 6 can't be a case, though, where there is, you know, 7 professional cooperation, which is in the best interest of everybody in moving this case along. 8 9 So -- all right. So we may need a time for 10 discovery, which might extend the period for filing, say, 11 like in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment, 12 Based upon -right? 13 MR. YEE: Correct, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: -- standing? And then we may need a 15 detour if the defendant decides -- well, to follow up on the motion today, decides to try to get some of the 16 17 standing issues addressed before a hearing on the merits, 18 right? He may -- he may pursue that. Although you're 19 not --20 MR. THORNTON: Correct, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: You're not sure. Okay, so then there 22

might be that detour. But then ultimately we'll get to a hearing, a merits hearing. And both sides agree it should be decided on summary judgment, right?

MR. THORNTON: That's correct.

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1 MR. YOST: Yes, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: And again, we could be interrupted or 3 the schedule could be extended by a motion for preliminary 4 injunction, which no one can say today whether it will be 5 filed or not. But all this takes us at least into late 6 summer/early fall of next year. Okay. 7 By the way, one of the things I noticed is, I know Mr. Yost is from California. I know of the old Nossaman 8 Isn't this the continuation of the old Nossaman 9 firm. 10 Waters? 11 MR. THORNTON: It is, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, Waters was a friend of mine. 12 13 And I know the Nossaman firm's at least headquartered in california. 14 15 MR. THORNTON: And I live in California, Your 16 Honor. 17 THE COURT: Are you -- are you in the northern office or --18 19 MR. THORNTON: I'm in the Southern California office. 20 21 THE COURT: Southern California office, okay. we have two lawyers from California. Mr. Yee's calling is 22 23 from Washington, D.C. 24 MR. YEE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Of course, for this case the Judges

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sure felt prudent -- felt it prudent to get an outside judge. And they got me and, of course, I'm from California. So what I'm saying is I think some of these hearings -- not the final hearing on the merits, which I think should be here, but I think some of these, if we have to hold some hearings in between in the interim, I think we should hold them in California because, you know, we're not going to have a jury. I'm talking about on these standing motions or things like that, all right? We need another conference, I think it'll be more efficient for everybody, all right? Including the government.

MR. THORNTON: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. YOST: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So, anyway, I want you to keep that in mind. Although, I think obviously the hearing on the merits should be here and maybe the hearing on -- if there is a motion for preliminary injunction, I don't know, but we'll get to that later.

So the reason I mention that is I'm going to ask counsel to see if we can agree, all right, see if you can draft the scheduling order, all right? Together. And submit it to me. And I don't expect that to be airtight. I don't expect those, you know, deadlines to be set in concrete because a lot of things are going to happen. For instance, we don't even know how long it's going to take

to get the administrative record, right?

So I think we need to start on it. There should be at least target dates, all right? And then that's the reason I think we may have a couple of status conferences as we go along, and I don't see why we can't hold those in California. All right? And then we'll see where that -- where that takes us.

So we -- and so these are the dates you need: The target date for the completion of the administrative record, a date for the -- I'll call it the settlement of the administrative record. Then for the filing of the initial -- I think the contemplation in the status report is that the plaintiffs would file the initial motion for summary judgment, and then the defendants will file a cross-motion. And, now, maybe in between there, before their cross-motion, the defense may want some discovery. I don't know. Right? That may be the place, but at some point defense may want some discovery.

And then I think the -- the scheduling order should embody essentially what the agreement here is, that the plaintiffs will, you know, furnish, I'll call them, standing affidavits on the request or standing declarations on request. Okay? And -- and then I think there should be some time after that those declarations furnished for the defendant to decide whether it needs

discovery or not. Then after that we'll complete the briefing -- well, then after that the defendants may want to set some earlier motion for summary adjudication. I'll call them non-merits motions, all right?

And then after that there'll be the reply briefs and then we'll -- and then, you know, we should -- we'll have to set the -- the summary judgment motion on the merits for hearing. Right? Which would conclude the process. And then somewhere in between -- we can't decide now what we're going to do; but somewhere in between, plaintiffs may find it necessary to file a motion for preliminary injunction.

Okay. Now -- all right. Try to get together and put that in an order. I think --

MR. YOST: We shall.

THE COURT: -- it'll be a good exercise. And speaking of good exercise, I don't know if there's any possibility, you know, you people can settle this case or not. Have you thought about mediation of some kind? Not yet? Too early? Or you see your opponent set in concrete? I don't know. Anyway --

MR. THORNTON: We're always happy to entertain discussions with plaintiffs, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm sure you are. All right. But keep that in mind.

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1
            All right. Anything else we need to discuss
2
    today?
 3
            MR. THORNTON:
                           No, Your Honor.
            MR. YOST:
                       No, Your Honor.
 4
 5
            THE COURT: All right.
6
            MR. YEE: Just one point of clarification, Your
 7
    Honor?
            Is the Court anticipating that the next status
    conference, which is tentatively scheduled for January
8
    13th, that's going to be in Your Honor's courtroom in
9
10
    Pasadena?
                        The next status conference for what?
11
            THE COURT:
            MR. YEE: For this case.
12
13
            THE COURT: Oh, for this? I don't know. See, I'm
14
    just -- I was just sort of speculating that, you know,
15
    we'll probably need a status conference or two on --
    right? On certain, I'll call them, you know, routine
16
    scheduling matters, things like that.
17
18
            MR. THORNTON: Might I suggest, Your Honor, that I
    think in the context of the parties meeting on the
19
20
    scheduling order that we can try to agree on the date for
21
    a subsequent status conference, and we'll obviously
22
    coordinate that with your clerk?
23
            THE COURT: That's fine.
                       I agree, Your Honor.
24
            MR. YOST:
            THE COURT: That's good. And then we should have
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1
    it in either Pasadena or San Francisco.
2
            MR. YOST: Wonderful, Your Honor.
 3
            THE COURT: You'll like it there, Mr. Yee.
 4
            MR. YEE: I do like it there, Your Honor. Thank
 5
    you.
6
            MR. THORNTON: Pasadena would be fine for me.
7
            THE COURT: Okay. Is that it?
8
            MR. YEE: Yes.
9
            MR. YOST: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.
10
                        I appreciate your attendance.
            THE COURT:
                                                        Ι
11
    appreciate your cooperation and the argument. The
12
    motion's under submission. I expect in due course a
13
    proposed scheduling order from counsel. I hope we can
    have it in the next week, ten days, something like that.
14
15
    All right?
16
            MR. YOST: We can do that.
17
            THE COURT: Thank you very much.
18
                           Thank you, Your Honor.
            MR. THORNTON:
19
            (Concluded at 11:30 a.m.)
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## COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE I, Ann B. Matsumoto, Per Diem Court Reporter, United States District Court, District of Hawaii, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and complete transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. DATED at Honolulu, Hawaii, December 12, 2011. /s/ Ann B. Matsumoto Ann B. Matsumoto, CSR 377 Registered Professional Reporter